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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Diverse studies support the central role of Thought-Action Fusion (TAF) and other
metacognitive variables in the understanding of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) sym-
ptomatology. However, a more detailed study of the involvement of these variables is needed.
This article seeks to assess the possible mediating role of the factors of the Metacognitions
Questionnaire (MCQ) in the relationship between TAF and OCD symptoms both in clini-
cal  and non-clinical samples. A cross-sectional design was used in which 120 participants,
divided into three groups (two clinical and one non-clinical), completed the questionnaires
assessing the constructs of interest. The mediational ﬁndings generally supported the pro-
posed mediation model. Speciﬁcally, the mediational analyses focused on negative beliefs
and the need to control (metacognitive factors of the MCQ) showed that MCQ Negative beliefs
mediated the effects of TAF-Total and TAF factors (except for the TAF-Moral) on OCD sym-
ptomatology in the OCD group. The MCQ Need to control was non-signiﬁcant as a mediator
of  the relationships between TAF and OCD. However, it was observed that this mediation
approached signiﬁcance, with considerable effect sizes. In the clinical-control group, the
analyses showed that MCQ Negative beliefs mediated the effects of TAF-Likelihood-Oneself
on  OCD symptoms. In the remaining group, neither MCQ Negative beliefs nor MCQ Need to
control were found to be signiﬁcant mediators. It is generally concluded that certain beliefs,
such as TAF, can evolve toward more complex metacognitive beliefs, which ultimately lead
to  the development of OCD symptoms.© 2016 Fundacio´n Universitaria Konrad Lorenz. Published by Elsevier Espan˜a, S.L.U. This
is  an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: paula.odriozola.gonzalez@uva.es (P. Odriozola-González).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.sumpsi.2016.08.001
0121-4381/© 2016 Fundacio´n Universitaria Konrad Lorenz. Published by Elsevier Espan˜a, S.L.U. This is an open access article under the
CC  BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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El  papel  mediador  de  las  variables  metacognitivas  en  la  relación  entre  la
fusión  pensamiento-acción  y  la  sintomatología  obsesivo-compulsiva
Palabras clave:
Metacogniciones
Fusión pensamiento-acción
Trastorno obsesivo-compulsivo
r  e  s  u  m  e  n
Diversos estudios han sen˜alado el papel de la fusión pensamiento-acción (TAF) y otras
creencias metacognitivas en la comprensión de la sintomatología obsesivo-compulsiva. No
obstante, es preciso un estudio más pormenorizado que esclarezca la contribución de estas
variables. El objetivo del presente estudio es evaluar el posible papel mediador de los factores
del  Cuestionario de Metacogniciones (MCQ) en la relación entre la TAF y la sintomatología
obsesivo-compulsiva, tanto en muestras clínicas como no clínicas. Con un disen˜o transver-
sal,  120 participantes divididos en tres grupos (dos clínicos y uno no clínico) respondieron
a  los cuestionarios que evaluaban los constructos de interés. Los resultados apoyaron de
manera general el modelo mediacional propuesto. Concretamente, los análisis se centraron
en  la necesidad de control y las creencias negativas (factores metacognitivos del MCQ) y
mostraron los siguientes resultados. En el grupo de sintomatología obsesivo-compulsiva,
las  creencias negativas mediaron los efectos de TAF-total y los factores de TAF en la sin-
tomatología obsesivo-compulsiva, a excepción de TAF-moral. El factor necesidad de control
no  llegó a ser un mediador signiﬁcativo; no obstante, esta mediación estaba próxima a
la  signiﬁcatividad y se contemplaron taman˜os del efecto considerables. Respecto al grupo
de  control clínico, los análisis mostraron que las creencias negativas mediaban los efec-
tos  de TAF-probabilidad-uno mismo en la sintomatología obsesivo-compulsiva. En el grupo
restante, ni las creencias negativas ni la necesidad de control resultaron ser mediadores
signiﬁcativos. Se concluye, de manera general, que creencias como la TAF pueden evolu-
cionar hacia creencias metacognitivas más complejas que conllevan, en último término, el
desarrollo de la sintomatología obsesivo-compulsiva.
© 2016 Fundacio´n Universitaria Konrad Lorenz. Publicado por Elsevier Espan˜a, S.L.U.
Este es un artı´culo Open Access bajo la licencia CC BY-NC-ND (http://creativecommons.
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aObsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is characterized by
 series of recurrent and persistent thoughts, urges, or
mages denominated obsessions – experienced as intrusive
nd unwanted – as well as a series of behaviors called compul-
ions, performed in order to eliminate the distress provoked
y the former (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Most
raditional psychological approaches to this symptomatology
ndicate the role of cognitive variables as a central element
Rachman, 1997). However, in recent decades, new cognitive
pproaches have emerged, attracting attention to metacog-
itions concerning the dysfunctional beliefs, in contrast to
raditional cognitive models which focused on cognitive vari-
bles. Metacognitions refer to the structures and processes
nvolved in the control, modiﬁcation, and interpretation of
ne’s thoughts. One of the most inﬂuential of these new
pproaches is the model of Self-Regulatory Executive Func-
ion (S-REF; Wells & Matthews, 1996). According to the S-REF
odel, a particularly problematic mode of processing associ-
ted with and directed by underlying metacognitive beliefs is
onceptualized as one of major factors involved in the vul-
erability to and maintenance of emotional disorders (Wells,
009). Thus, metacognitive beliefs lead to the activation of a
peciﬁc pattern of thinking called the Cognitive Attentional
yndrome (CAS). This consists of repetitive thinking in the
orm of worry and rumination, excessive attentional focus on
houghts and feelings, and coping behaviors such as avoid-
nce and thought suppression. Speciﬁcally, Gwilliam, Wells,
nd Cartwright-Hatton (2004) suggest the existence of twoorg/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
broad types of metacognitive beliefs in OCD symptomato-
logy: beliefs concerning the meaning and power of intrusive
thoughts, and beliefs about the need to control thoughts
and/or to perform rituals. The ﬁrst set of beliefs have been
termed “fusion beliefs” and include three types of fusion
(Wells, 2009): Thought-Action Fusion (TAF), the belief that a
thought alone can cause an unwanted action or have moral
consequences; Thought-Event Fusion (TEF), the belief that a
thought can either cause an event or else it means that an
event has happened in the past; and Thought-Object Fusion
(TOF), the belief that thoughts and feelings can be transferred
onto objects. The second domain includes beliefs concerning
the need to perform rituals to attenuate the consequences
associated with obsessive thoughts. Most of the beliefs iden-
tiﬁed by the Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group
– OCCWG as being essential to OCD can also be considered
as metacognitive beliefs. In particular, regarding the beliefs
evaluated with the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ)
designed for this purpose (OCCWG, 2005), the importance
given to intrusive thoughts and need to control them as well as
the need for certainty and responsibility for harm and overes-
timation of danger can be considered as metacognitive beliefs.
Several studies support the relation between metacog-
nitions and OCD symptoms, thereby ﬁnding important
correlations both in clinical and nonclinical samples (Grøtte
et al., 2015; Myers & Wells, 2013; Rees & Anderson, 2013).
Myers, Fisher, and Wells (2009) found that metacognitive
beliefs are the main predictor of OCD symptomatology versus
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other related factors typical of traditional cognitive trends,
such as responsibility or worry. Nevertheless, metacogni-
tions also seem to play a relevant role in such diverse
psychopathologies as depression (Halvorsen et al., 2015), eat-
ing disorders (Olstad, Solem, Hjemdal, & Hagen, 2015) or
psychotic symptoms (García-Montes et al., 2013).
Most of the previous studies have assessed metacogni-
tive beliefs with the Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ;
Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997), or with a shortened 30-
item version, the MCQ-30 (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004).
Exploratory factor analysis has supported a ﬁve-factor model
consistent with the original MCQ: positive beliefs, uncontrol-
lability and danger (negative beliefs), cognitive conﬁdence,
need to control thoughts, and cognitive self-consciousness.
The factor related to negative beliefs about uncontrollability
of thoughts and the factor referring to the need to control
thoughts have been especially and signiﬁcantly related to OCD
(Bortolon et al., 2014; Cucchi et al., 2012), in the lines of the
underlined text from OCCWG (2005) regarding the variable
need to control thoughts as an essential belief of this sym-
ptomatology. Likewise, the cognitive conﬁdence factor, which
assesses the lack of conﬁdence in cognitive functioning, has
been pointed out as being closely related to this symptomato-
logy (Cucchi et al., 2012).
Another construct speciﬁcally related to OCD since its ori-
gins is TAF (Shafran, Thordarson, & Rachman, 1996). TAF
refers to a set of cognitive biases that lead to establishing
incorrect causal relationships between thoughts and exter-
nal reality. Factor analysis has revealed two forms of this
phenomenon (Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris, & Schmidt, 2001).
On the one hand, TAF-Moral, the belief that having an unac-
ceptable thought is morally equivalent to performing it (i.e.,
thinking about blaspheming is as bad as actually blasphem-
ing). And, on the other hand, TAF-Likelihood, the belief that
having a thought about an unacceptable event increases the
probability that the event will actually happen (i.e., think-
ing about injuring oneself after falling increases the risk
of actually falling and being injured). Two subtypes of the
TAF-Likelihood have also been distinguished: TAF-Likelihood-
Oneself, the belief that a given event will happen to oneself,
and TAF-Likelihood-Others, the belief that a given event will
happen to others. As noted, the TAF construct was subse-
quently integrated into the metacognitive variables of OCD
(Gwilliam et al., 2004). However, it has also been assumed that
TAF could play an important role in other mental disorders
such as major depression (Kivi & Ne’mat Mohammadipour Rik,
2013) or schizophrenia (Elif, Basaran, Hilal, & Ali Emre,  2008).
Before the growing development of the TAF construct,
researchers had considered it as magical thinking (Shafran
et al., 1996). This kind of thinking, according to García-Montes,
Pérez-Álvarez, Odriozola-González, Vallina-Fernández, and
Perona-Garcelán (2014), seems to occur particularly in chil-
dren (Piaget, 1929) and so-called “primitive societies” (Golden,
1977). These beliefs are assumed to play a minimal role in adult
behavior, only emerging prominently in stressful situations
(Jahoda, 1969) or in psychological disorders, such as OCD and
schizophrenia (Einstein & Menzies, 2008; García-Montes et al.,
2013).
Therefore, it seems that TAF, or its predecessor, mag-
ical thinking, like other metacognitive beliefs, are related (2 0 1 6) 80–89
constructs and possibly central factors in the comprehension
of OCD symptomatology. However, the predictor role of these
constructs in OCD symptomatology and the relation between
them is still unclear, and more  detailed study of the involve-
ment of these variables is needed. Elucidating these issues
might not only lead to better understanding of the develop-
ment and maintenance of OCD symptomatology but also to
knowing how to implement more  effective preventive and/or
therapeutic strategies. Therefore, in this study, we  aimed to
investigate the role of TAF and other metacognitions eval-
uated by the MCQ in OCD symptoms both in clinical and
nonclinical samples. For this purpose, we  selected a clini-
cally heterogeneous control group and a nonclinical control
group. This selection is relevant to determine whether the
role of these variables is speciﬁc to OCD symptomatology,
or it can be observed in different symptomatologies, play-
ing a similar role to that of other transdiagnostic variables
involved in different problems, such as experiential avoid-
ance (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). In this
sense, ﬁrstly, we  hypothesized that the group with OCD sym-
ptomatology and the clinical-control group would present a
greater degree of TAF and other metacognitive beliefs than
the nonclinical group. Secondly, we predicted that metacogni-
tion evaluated by the MCQ would be the best predictor of OCD
symptomatology and, thirdly, that certain types of metacogni-
tion (need to control and negative beliefs) would mediate the
relationship between TAF and OCD symptoms. These speciﬁc
metacognitive variables were chosen due to their outstanding
special relationship with OCD (Bortolon et al., 2014; Cucchi
et al., 2012). These mediational results are compatible with
the hypothesis that the metacognitive beliefs assessed with
the MCQ  are more  complex cognitive factors, developed sub-
sequent to previous cognitive factors such as TAF or magical
thinking and, in turn, their development could ultimately lead
to the performance of dysfunctional strategies that promote
and maintain OCD symptomatology.
Method
Participants
For this study, we formed three groups of patients diagnosed
with various disorders according to Diagnostic and statistical
manual of mental disorders – fourth edition revised (APA, 2000)
criteria.
Group 1 (OCD, n = 37), patients diagnosed with OCD,  mostly
suffering from consciousness/doubt obsessions, followed by
those related to checking. We were especially careful to rule
out potential participants who presented with any other
comorbid disorder; however, the group reﬂects the character-
istic heterogeneity of OCDs. Group 2 (clinical-control group,
n = 41), patients treated by mental health services for diverse
problems excluding OCD (adjustment disorder, n = 7; general-
ized anxiety, n = 6; anxiety disorder with agoraphobia, n = 3;
anxiety disorder without agoraphobia, n = 1; posttraumatic
stress disorder, n = 1; severe stress disorder, n = 1; personal-
ity disorder, n = 4; major depressive disorder, n = 5; dysthymia,
n = 3; unspeciﬁed depressive disorder, n = 1; anorexia ner-
vosa, n = 1; bulimia nervosa, n = 1; alcohol dependence, n = 1;
suma psicológica 2 3 
Table 1 – Characteristics of the groups.
OCD group Clinical control
group
Nonclinical
group
N 37 41 42
Age
Mean (SD) 31.35 (8.83) 31.49 (10.28) 35.12 (9.51)
Gender
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the predicting variable (i.e., TAF) that occurs indirectly throughMale 22 20 24
Female 15 21 18
ubstance abuse, n = 1; social phobia, n = 1, speciﬁc phobia,
 = 1; marital problems, n = 2; primary insomnia, n = 1). We
xcluded patients who had previously been diagnosed with
CD. Group 3 (nonclinical group, n = 42), people who attended
 psycho-technical assessment center to renew their driving
icense. Participants who were receiving psychoactive med-
cation or psychological treatment were excluded from the
tudy.
Patients with OCD and those in the clinical-control group
ere receiving attention as outpatients from various psychol-
gists. None of them was being treated with antipsychotic
edication although, in some cases, they were receiving ben-
odiazepines or antidepressants.
Table 1 shows a summary of participants’ characteristics
y group.
nstruments
etacognitions Questionnaire-30 (MCQ-30; Wells &
artwright-Hatton, 2004). The MCQ-30 is a 30-item ques-
ionnaire rated on a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1
strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). Factorial analysis carried
ut by the authors yielded ﬁve empirically differentiated and
elatively stable factors: cognitive conﬁdence, positive beliefs,
ognitive self-consciousness, uncontrollability and danger
negative beliefs), and need to control thoughts. The MCQ-30
as shown good internal consistency, convergent validity, and
cceptable test-retest reliability. We  used the Spanish version
mployed by García-Montes et al. (2013), which showed good
nternal consistency for the global questionnaire (.91) and for
he ﬁve subscales administered in this study (alphas from .77
o .85).
Thought-Action Fusion Scale (TAFS; Shafran et al., 1996).
he TAF is a 19-item instrument rated on 5-point Likert-
ype scale that assesses psychological fusion of thoughts and
ctions in the following three subscales: TAF-Moral (e.g., “Hav-
ng blasphemous thought is almost as sinful to me  as a
lasphemous action”); TAF-Likelihood-Others (e.g., “If I think
f a relative/friend losing their job, this increases the risk that
hey will lose their job”); and TAF-Likelihood-Oneself (e.g., “If I
hink of myself falling ill, this increases the risk that I will fall
ll”). This instrument was translated into Spanish according
o recommendations of Mun˜iz, Elosua, and Hambleton (2013).
hus, we  selected two translators, one familiar with the Span-
sh culture and another with that of the USA, and used the
ack-translation method; that is, the ﬁrst translator trans-
ated into Spanish, and this translation was then translated
ack into English by the second translator. In this study, the(2 0 1 6) 80–89 83
alpha for the global scale was .89, and for the three subscales:
.92 for TAF-Moral, .92 for TAF-Likelihood-Others, and .94 for
TAF-Likelihood-Self.
Maudsley Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (MOCI;
Hodgson & Rachman, 1977). This classic questionnaire is
widely used to measure OCD symptomatology. It has 30 items
with a dichotomous true/false response format and contains
four subscales: Cleaning, Checking, Slowness, and Doubting.
We used the Spanish adaptation by Ávila (1986), which had
an alpha coefﬁcient of .81.
Procedure
After obtaining the research ethics committee’s approval, all
patients were assessed with semi-structured interviews to
verify whether at that time they met  the DSM-IV-TR (APA,
2000) diagnostic criteria for their group. Prior to application,
all participants had provided their informed consent, after
which they completed the three questionnaires in the order
described above. Participants were encouraged to ask ques-
tions about any of the items that raised doubts. The patient’s
usual psychologist conducted the interview and administered
the tests. The participants were not paid or rewarded.
Data  analysis
Our aim was to examine the role of TAF and other metacogni-
tive beliefs assessed by the MCQ-30 on OCD symptoms. First,
we compared the mean scores in the variables of interest in
the three groups (OCD, clinical-control group, and nonclinical
group) by means of analyses or multivariate analyses of vari-
ance. Secondly, we carried out three multiple linear regression
analyses (one for each group), in which we introduced partic-
ipants’ scores on the MOCI as dependent variable, and scores
on the MCQ and TAF factors as predictor variables. Finally,
we examined the potential role of certain MCQ  factors (need
to control and negative beliefs) as mediator variables of the
effects of TAF on OCD symptoms (MOCI scores). For the last
objective, we  conducted parallel multiple mediation analyses
in each group, using the nonparametric bootstrapping proce-
dure for estimating direct and indirect effects with the model
described by Preacher and Hayes (2008). In the mediation
analyses, scores on the MOCI served as dependent variable,
scores on the MCQ factors were used as the proposed mediat-
ing variables, and TAF factors and TAF-Total scores were the
independent variables. Mediation was deemed as signiﬁcant
if the 95% bias corrected (BC) bootstrap conﬁdence intervals
(CI) for the indirect effects based on 20,000 bootstrapped sam-
ples did not include zero (see Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The
effect sizes of MCQ scores as mediators of the effects of TAF
factors or TAF-Total scores on OCD symptoms were com-
puted using the completely standardized indirect effect (abcs;
Preacher & Kelley, 2011) and providing 95% BC bootstrap CIs.
This effect size can be interpreted as the expected change in
the dependent variable (i.e., MOCI scores) per unit change inthe mediator (i.e., MCQ Need to control). Following Kenny and
Judd’s (2014) suggestion, small, medium, and large effect sizes
would be, respectively, .01, .09, and .25.
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Table 2 – MCQ-30 scores of clinical and nonclinical groups compared with the nonclinical sample from the original study.
MCQ-30 OCD (n = 37)
Mean (SD)
Clinical control
(n = 41)
Mean (SD)
Non-clinical
group (n = 42)
Mean (SD)
F(df,  df),
p value
Eta
squared
Original study (Wells
& Cartwright-Hatton,
2004)
Non-clinical (n = 182)
Mean (SD)
Factor 1. Cognitive
conﬁdence
10.65 (4.97) 12.00 (5.12) 11.26 (4.32) .774 (2, 117) .464 .013 9.51 (4.06)
Factor 2. Positive beliefs 10.27 (3.93) 9.76 (3.88) 9.57 (3.76) .342 (2, 117) .711 .006 9.60 (3.46)
Factor 3. Cognitive
self-consciousness
15.49 (4.65) 14.98 (4.43) 14.71 (3.93) .320 (2, 117) .727 .005 11.65 (4.68)
Factor 4. Negative beliefs 15.30 (5.17) 14.56 (4.02) 13.74 (4.65) 1.126 (2, 117) .328 .019 9.30 (4.00)
Factor 5. Need to control 13.30 (4.63) 13.07 (4.48) 11.93 (4.23) 1.107 (2, 117) .334 .019 8.34 (2.62)
1.21 Total score 65.00 (17.73) 64.37 (16.08) 6
Note. MCQ-30: Metacognitions Questionnaire.
Results
Comparison  statistics  in  relation  to  the  participants
No statistically signiﬁcant group differences were found for
participant’s age, F(2, 117) = 2.03, p = .136, nor was there any
statistically signiﬁcant difference in the patients’ distribution
in the groups according to gender, 2 = 1.01, df = 2, p = .60.
Tests  prior  to  analysis  of  the  results
We  veriﬁed the homogeneity of the error variances by means
of the Levene test, ﬁnding that the data fulﬁll the assumption
of homoscedasticity for the target factors of the MCQ: cog-
nitive conﬁdence, F(2, 117) = .64, p = .53; positive beliefs, F(2,
117) = .09, p = .92; cognitive self-consciousness, F(2, 117) = .35,
p = .70; negative beliefs, F(2, 117) = 1.30, p = .28; and need to con-
trol thoughts, F(2, 117) = .04, p = .96. Likewise, the MCQ-Total
scores met  the homoscedasticity assumption, F(2, 117) = 1.27,
p = .28.
The TAF-Moral subscale, TAF-Likelihood-Oneself, and TAF-
Total scores satisﬁed the null hypothesis of the Levene test,
respectively: F(2, 117) = 1.45, p = .24; F(2, 117) = .71, p = .49; and
F(2, 117) = .75, p = .48. However, the TAF-Likelihood-Others
subscale violated this assumption, F(2, 117) = 5.18, p = .007.
Therefore, in this case, data were analyzed using Welch’s test.
Lastly, participants’ MOCI-Total scores regarding the homo-
geneity assumption revealed no signiﬁcant differences, F(2,
117) = .81, p = .45.
Table 3 – TAFS scores of clinical and nonclinical groups compar
TAFS OCD (n = 37)
Mean (SD)
Clinical control
(n = 41)
Mean (SD)
Non-clinical
group (n = 42)
Mean (SD)
TAF-Moral 19.08 (14.24) 14.76 (11.54) 14.40 (12.35) 1.
TAF-Likelihood-Others 1.95 (4.04) 0.80 (2.40) 1.02 (2.18) 1.
TAF-Likelihood-Self 2.43 (2.93) 2.41 (3.55) 1.81 (3.15) .4
TAF-total score 23.46 (15.83) 17.98 (13.55) 17.24 (13.11) 2.
Note.  TAFS: Thought Action Fusion Scale. NA: data not available.(15.60) .616 (2, 117) .542 .010 48.41 (13.31)
Comparison  between  groups  in  metacognitive  variables,
TAF, and  OCD  symptoms
To analyze possible statistically signiﬁcant group differences
in the metacognitive variables, we carried out a MANOVA, in
which the participant’s group was a ﬁxed factor, and scores in
the different MCQ factors or in the MCQ-Total were dependent
variables. Wilks’ Lambda coefﬁcient showed a nonsigniﬁcant
global effect, F(10, 226) = .75, p = .68.
With regard to TAF, we carried out a MANOVA, in which
the participant’s group was a ﬁxed factor, and scores on TAF-
Moral and TAF-Likelihood-Oneself factors or TAF-Total scores
were dependent variables. Wilks’ Lambda coefﬁcient showed
a nonsigniﬁcant global effect, F(6, 230) = 1.31, p = .26. Regarding
TAF-Likelihood-Others, Welch’s test did not yield any signiﬁ-
cant group differences, T(2, 71.98) = 1.12, p = .33.
Tables 2 and 3 show, respectively, a comparison of mean
scores between this study and those reported in the original
validation studies of the MCQ-30 (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton,
2004) and the TAFS (Shafran et al., 1996).
Lastly, in order to analyze possible statistically signiﬁ-
cant group differences in the MOCI scores, we  carried out an
ANOVA in which the participants’ group was a ﬁxed factor and
MOCI scores were the dependent variables. When a signiﬁcant
difference was found (p < .05), post hoc analysis using Bonfer-
roni’s correction was used to locate this difference. Table 4
shows the results of this analysis as well as that reported
in the original validation of the MOCI (Hodgson & Rachman,
1977). The OCD group presented higher OCD symptoms than
ed with samples from the original study.
F (df, df),
p value
Eta
squared
Original study
(Shafran et al., 1996)
Obsessionals
(n = 118)
Adults
(n = 122)
Students
(n  = 272)
615 (2, 117) .203 .027 20.03 (13.17) 12.74 (11.13) 17.97 (10.53)
626 (2, 117) .201 .027 4.77 (4.74) 1.03 (2.14) 2.59 (3.29)
93 (2, 117) .612 .008 4.41 (3.57) 2.09 (2.49) 3.42 (3.00)
222 (2, 117) .113 .037 NA NA NA
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Table 4 – Mean scores and 95% conﬁdence intervals.
MOCI score OCD Clinical control Nonclinical group F(df, df), p value Eta squared Original study
(Hodgson & Rachman, 1977)
Obsessionals
(n  = 100)
Neurotics
(n  = 50)
Mean (SD)  12.35a (5.61) 10.17 (4.81) 9.26a (5.50) 3.46 (2, 117) .035 .06 18.86 (4.92) 9.27 (5.53)
Note.  Adjusted mean shown. Values sharing the same letter are signiﬁcantly different, based on Bonferroni’s correction.
Table 5 – Multiple regression analysis for MOCI (each group).
Group Scales Partial correlation ˇ  T p
OCD MCQ Negative beliefs .476 .476 3.202 .003
Clinical control MCQ Negative beliefs .382 .382 2.578 .014
Nonclinical MCQ Negative beliefs .572 .533 4.354 .000
TAF-Moral .396 .330 2.694 .010
t
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he clinical and nonclinical groups. However, there were no
tatistically signiﬁcant differences between the OCD and the
linical-control group.
etacognitive  and  TAF  factors  as  predictors  of  OCD
ymptoms
o identify the MCQ  and TAF factors that may predict pre-
isposition to OCD symptoms as measured by the MOCI for
ach one of the groups in the study, we carried out three
ultiple linear regression analyses (see Table 5). Stepwise
ethod was used to perform the regression. For this purpose,
e introduced participant’s scores in the MOCI as dependent
ariables and scores in the different MCQ  and TAF factors as
redictor variables.
Statistically signiﬁcant values were obtained for all groups,
CD group: F(1, 35) = 10.250, p = .003; adjusted R2 = .204;
linical-control group: F(1, 39) = 6.644, p = .014; adjusted
Table 6 – Data for the parallel multiple mediation analyses of th
(TAF-Moral, TAF-Likelihood-Oneself, TAF-Likelihood-Others, an
(MCQ factors) for OCD group.
Paths Regression analyses Size effect
TAF-Moral
ab DV – OCD symptoms
indirect effect via:
MCQ Negative beliefs .040 
MCQ Need to control .039 
TAF-Likelihood-Oneself
ab DV – OCD symptoms
indirect effect via:
MCQ Negative beliefs .190 
MCQ Need to control .113 
TAF-Likelihood-Others
ab DV – OCD symptoms
indirect effect via:
MCQ Negative beliefs .151 
MCQ Need to control .124 
TAF-Total
ab DV – OCD symptoms
indirect effect via:
MCQ Negative beliefs .113 
MCQ Need to control .098 
Note.  Path ab = total indirect effect.R2 = .124; and nonclinical group: F(2, 39) = 14.075, p < .001;
adjusted R2 = .389. As seen in Table 5, the factor with the most
weight to account for OCD symptoms was negative beliefs.
Mediation  analysis  of  the  Effect  of  TAF  on  OCD  symptoms
through  metacognitions
Tables 6–8 show the data concerning the parallel multiple
mediation analyses conducted to analyze the mediator role
of metacognitive variables (negative beliefs and need to con-
trol) as measured by the MCQ in the effect of TAF and each of
its three factors on OCD symptoms.
OCD  group
In the OCD group (see Table 6), the indirect effects of TAF-
Moral on OCD symptoms through MCQ  Negative beliefs
and MCQ  Need to control were nonsigniﬁcant. The indirect
effects of TAF-Likelihood-Oneself, TAF-Likelihood-Others, and
e effects on OCD-symptoms of Thought-Action Fusion
d TAF-Total scores) through metacognitive variables
 Coeff. or point estimate SE Bootstrapping BC 95% CI
Lower Upper
.016 .031 −.035 .095
.015 .023 −.011 .096
.363 .227 .038 .931
.216 .200 −.117 .707
.209 .128 .006 .521
.172 .171 −.125 .549
.040 .030 .001 .133
.035 .034 −.012 .131
86  suma psicológica 2 3 (2 0 1 6) 80–89
Table 7 – Data for the parallel multiple mediation analyses of the effects on OCD-symptoms of Thought-Action Fusion
(TAF-Moral, TAF-Likelihood-Oneself, TAF-Likelihood-Others and TAF-Total scores) through metacognitive variables (MCQ
factors) for clinical-control group.
Paths Regression analyses Size effect Coeff. or point estimate SE Bootstrapping BC 95% CI
Lower Upper
TAF-Moral
ab DV – OCD symptoms
indirect effect via:
MCQ Negative beliefs −.007 −.003 .032 −.055 .068
MCQ Need to control .003 .001 .020 −.029 .055
TAF-Likelihood-Oneself
ab DV – OCD symptoms
indirect effect via:
MCQ Negative beliefs .135 .183 .178 .003 .744
MCQ Need to control .002 .002 .090 −.178 .189
TAF-Likelihood-Others
ab DV – OCD symptoms
indirect effect via:
MCQ Negative beliefs .074 .148 .149 −.083 .554
MCQ Need to control −.000 −.000  .083 −.168 .189
TAF-Total
ab DV – OCD symptoms
indirect effect via:
MCQ Negative beliefs .040 .014 .031 −.020 .107
MCQ Need to control .005 .002 .019 −.030 .048
Note.  Path ab = total indirect effect.
Table 8 – Data for the parallel multiple mediation analyses of the effects on OCD-symptoms of Thought-Action Fusion
(TAF-Moral, TAF-Likelihood-Oneself, TAF-Likelihood-Others and TAF-Total scores) through metacognitive variables (MCQ
factors) for nonclinical control group.
Paths Regression analyses Size effect Coeff. or point estimate SE Bootstrapping BC 95% CI
Lower Upper
TAF-Moral
ab DV – OCD symptoms
indirect effect via:
MCQ Negative beliefs .035 .016 .045 −.054 .131
MCQ Need to control .028 .013 .027 −.025 .093
TAF-Likelihood-Oneself
ab DV – OCD symptoms
indirect effect via:
MCQ Negative beliefs .027 .047 .106 −.113 .332
MCQ Need to control .027 .047 .097 −.043 .433
TAF-Likelihood-Others
ab DV – OCD symptoms
indirect effect via:
MCQ Negative beliefs .090 .228 .213 −.046 .870
MCQ Need to control .040 .100 .160 −.071 −.650
TAF-Total
ab DV – OCD symptoms
indirect effect via:
MCQ Negative beliefs .058 .024 .040 −.040 .131
MCQ Need to control 028 .012 .027 −.032 .079Note.  Path ab = total indirect effect.
TAF-Total on OCD symptoms through MCQ  Need to control
were also nonsigniﬁcant, with medium effect sizes.
On another hand, the indirect effects of TAF-Likelihood-
Oneself, TAF-Likelihood-Others, and TAF-Total on OCD
symptoms through MCQ  Negative beliefs were signiﬁcant,
with medium effect sizes.
Clinical-control  group
In the clinical-control group (see Table 7), the indirect effects
of TAF-Moral, TAF-Likelihood-Others, and TAF-Total on OCD
symptoms through MCQ  Negative beliefs were nonsigniﬁcant.
However, the indirect effect of TAF-Likelihood-Oneself on OCD
symptoms through MCQ  Negative beliefs was signiﬁcant, with
a medium effect size. The indirect effects of TAF-Moral, TAF-
Likelihood-Oneself, TAF-Likelihood-Others and TAF-Total on
OCD symptoms through MCQ  Need to control were also non-
signiﬁcant.Nonclinical  control  group
In the nonclinical control group (see Table 8), the indirect
effects of TAF-Moral, TAF-Likelihood-Oneself, TAF-Likelihood-
Others, and TAF-Total on OCD symptoms through MCQ
Negative beliefs were nonsigniﬁcant, as were the indirect
effects of TAF-Moral, TAF-Likelihood-Oneself, TAF-Likelihood-
Others and TAF-Total through MCQ  Need to control.
Discussion
This study hypothesized that patients with OCD and the
clinical-control group are characterized by a higher degree
of TAF and other metacognitive beliefs than the nonclinical
group. This hypothesis was not conﬁrmed. As shown in the
comparative tables (Tables 2 and 3), the metacognition scores
are fairly high in all three groups compared with the origi-
nal study. Regarding TAF, although no differential behavior
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f our participants can be observed in comparison with the
roups of the original study, there does seem to be a slight
ncrease in the nonclinical participants’ TAF-Moral factor. In
his regard, the observation of almost no group differences
n OCD symptoms (Table 4) leads to questioning whether the
andom composition of the participant group of this study
ay have been notably biased toward the obsessive pole.
uture studies would help clarify whether such bias actually
ccurred.
Secondly, it was considered that metacognitive beliefs and
he TAF could both predict a predisposition to OCD symptoms,
nderstood as a continuous variable present to a greater or
esser extent in all the participants. In this sense, the metacog-
itive negative beliefs factor was observed to be the main
redictor of OCD symptomatology. This variable was shown
o be relevant in previous studies (Bortolon et al., 2014; Cucchi
t al., 2012) and a factor that is consistent with the S-REF
odel of Wells and Matthews (1996) for the prediction of OCD
ymptoms.
Thirdly, in order to understand the functioning of vari-
bles related to OCD, this study examined the hypothesis
hat the effects of TAF on OCD symptoms would be medi-
ted by metacognitive beliefs. This hypothesis was partially
onﬁrmed. Thus, the mediation analyses in the OCD group
howed that MCQ  Negative beliefs mediated the effects of
AF-Total and TAF factors (except for the TAF-Moral) on
CD symptoms. The mediation analyses in the clinical-
ontrol group also showed that MCQ  Negative beliefs mediated
he effects of TAF-Likelihood-Oneself on OCD symptoms.
lthough the MCQ  Need to control was nonsigniﬁcant as a
ediator of the relationship between TAF and OCD, this medi-
tion approached signiﬁcance in the OCD group and, in fact,
t had considerable effect sizes (medium). In the remaining
roup, neither MCQ  Negative beliefs nor MCQ Need to con-
rol were found to be signiﬁcant mediators. In general, as
xpected, these mediational ﬁndings are compatible with the
ypothesis that certain metacognitive beliefs emerge after the
evelopment of other cognitive factors such as TAF or magical
hinking. These ﬁndings are also compatible with data show-
ng that this kind of magical thinking appears at early ages
nd is observed both in children and in so-called “primitive
ocieties” (Golden, 1977; Piaget, 1929). In fact, in support of
hese ﬁndings, Table 3 shows that, in the original study, the
bsessive groups obtained higher scores in TAF than those cor-
esponding to nonclinical adults–this is a salient ﬁnding. Thus,
ccording to our hypothesis, TAF evolves toward more com-
lex beliefs (e.g., negative beliefs about the uncontrollability
nd danger of thoughts), which ultimately lead to the per-
ormance of dysfunctional strategies, consequently deriving
n OCD symptomatology (according to the S-REF model). The
mplications of the ﬁndings presented and discussed herein
or the development of psychological interventions should be
reated with caution. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to pro-
ose preventive strategies that could limit the development of
ertain metacognitive beliefs and, therefore, OCD symptoma-
ology. In particular, strategies aimed at allowing patients with
CD symptomatology to reduce the importance of the power
nd danger of thoughts. This coincides with some therapeutic
ines such as those proposed by the third-generation thera-
ies that promote acceptance of private events (see reviews(2 0 1 6) 80–89 87
in Bluett, Homan, Morrison, Levin, & Twohig, 2014; Ruiz,
2012).
This study presents a major limitation in its cross-sectional
design, which does not allow determining whether changes
in the predictor variables (i.e., TAF) preceded changes in
the criterion variable (i.e., OCD symptoms) because causal
relationships among variables cannot be assumed without
establishing temporal precedence. This study has some addi-
tional limitations. First, as all data in this study were obtained
using self-report measures, relationships among variables
might be artiﬁcially inﬂated. Second, the size of samples of
the study should be taken into account when observing signif-
icant effects of the assessed variables. Third, the description of
the OCD symptomatology group, due to the failure to include
variables such as severity, duration, etc. limits the interpreta-
tion of the results of the study. Fourth, the heterogeneity of
the participants’ treatment stage when completing the ques-
tionnaires can lead to a potential bias in the study results.
Fifth, the choice of the clinical-control group with diverse sym-
ptomatology can limit the results because it does not capture
the speciﬁc behavior of the variables in a more  homogeneous
group. Sixth, the results focused only on the mediation of two
metacognitive variables, thereby ignoring the possible media-
tional role of other metacognitive variables.
A future study replicating and extending the present ﬁnd-
ings would support the S-REF model of OCD and the central
role of certain metacognitive beliefs in its development and
maintenance. From this perspective, these metacognitive
beliefs activate the speciﬁc pattern of thinking (CAS) that
leads to a series of unsuccessful strategies such as behavioral
avoidance, thought suppression, worry, rumination, or exces-
sive attention to thoughts and feelings. This is problematic
as it extends negative thinking, leads to reduced attentional
ﬂexibility, and a failure to exercise appropriate control over
negative experiences (Wells, 2009). A growing body of evi-
dence supports the metacognitive model of anxiety disorders
(Normann, van Emmerik, & Morina, 2014). Lastly – in line
with the other third-generation treatments of anxiety disor-
ders (see reviews in Bluett et al., 2014; Ruiz, 2012), this study
supports the idea that promoting alternative ways of respon-
ding to these metacognitive beliefs could be the main goal of
the psychological treatment of OCD symptoms.
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